Examining Intergovernmental Relations and Communication Failures in the Response to Hurricane Katrina

Examining Intergovernmental Relations and Communication Failures in the Response to Hurricane Katrina

What were the primary reasons why intergovernmental relations broke down (some say failed) during the response to Hurricane Katrina?

There is no doubt that government officials across all three levels of government did not understand the significant features of their responsibilities when responding to Hurricane Katrina. At the local level, city and parish officials were expecting the federal government to deal with the situation (Farazmand, 2009). Congressman Charles W. Boustany Jr. even stated that the people needed direct assistance from the federal government as well as control, command, and security, of which none was present. When it comes to the state level, broad decisions were made by Governor Blanco, but he failed to understand there was a need for more actions to implement those decisions (Moynihan, 2009). For instance, after requesting federal aid, she was unable to specify the types of assistance needed. Also, she specified resources that were effective for activities of relief but failed to issue policymaking orders for them to be moved to the areas that were stricken.

One major misunderstanding did occur at the national level. Among the challenges was as a result of the new components of the national response plans that were implemented in the year 2004 (Farazmand, 2009). Hurricane Katrina happened to be the first incident to be declared a national disaster since the response plans were implemented. The guidelines and policies had not yet been developed by the national government to ensure that the process was executed. Thus, government officials operated in unfamiliar territory during Hurricane Katrina; they had no idea what step they should take next. The uncertainties concerning responsibilities pervaded the entire system. In addition to the confusion, a lot of officials in the federal government acted like the bottom-up system was in place even though it was not up to date by the push process for a national disaster (Farazmand, 2009). All in all, the national government failed to understand what role it played in the response process. Proactive steps were not taken to help communities and residents get prepared for the imminent hurricane; the government did not act fast to ensure that emergency assistance was provided to the victims of that disaster, and it failed to mobilize the tasks of other private or public organizations of disaster assistance (Moynihan, 2009). Given the situation’s severity, the governments could not follow the traditional process of response. Federal, state, and local governments were less prepared to execute their pre-assigned tasks, and they were also not able to work together in a collaborative and coordinated manner.

What is the significance of communications between different levels of government and how could communications have been improved during the response to Katrina?

When it comes to dealing with disasters and any situation, communication is vital so that those in need can be helped. If there is active communication within government relations to get various tasks performed, there would be a bigger chance for disasters to be handled in a smooth manner (Garnett, 2009). Strategic Communication when responding to disasters tends to directly support the United States’ ability to create a secure and safe environment for the citizens. Strategic communication leads to the use of interdependent and integrated collaboration as a system of intergovernmental relations, allowing private and public sectors to work in unison and come up with solutions to problems larger than any single organization can handle. Communication also leads to the creation of networks and partnerships in collaborative efforts, even though they are not essentially integrated collaborations.

Communication during catastrophes and disasters such as Hurricane Katrina can serve many purposes; firstly, before the disaster occurs, it can manage the public’s expectations with regard to the potential assistance and capabilities at every level of the government (Kapucu, 2010). Secondly, communication provides information to the public before and during the occurrence of the disaster in order to facilitate the security and safety of American citizens. Thirdly, it is able to, if effectively and proactively used in unison with the observable effort of relief, serve to ensure the increment of the government’s credibility and serve to calm the netizens (Nielsen, 2012). While it is not put into consideration in the workshop, during a national disaster, strategic communication serves a role in foreign policy. Effective strategic communications portray any country, including the U.S as an efficient, capable, and effective respondent to its people’s needs and to inform the emerging democracies of the roles played by the government towards the citizens’ needs (Kapucu, 2010). Poor strategic communication, on the other hand, leads to the opposite perception globally.

The creation of regional outreach offices is a strategy that could have been used during Hurricane Katrina to enhance communication (Garnett, 2009). A national homeland system of security was needed to mobilize officials in public safety as well as local and state governments as partners while responding to emergencies. For effective coordination among the various governmental levels and private sectors, the Department of Homeland Security should have created county field administrative centres to work with officials both at the state and local levels so that strong community-based efforts could be encouraged.

Why have all levels of government in the U.S. been slow to invest in maintaining infrastructure, and how did lack of infrastructure investment play a role in the Katrina disaster?

The Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) is responsible for providing strategic guidance for entities at the local, state, and national levels in order to prioritize infrastructure (Leavitt, 2006). However, there is a lack of supporting plan of implementation to implement such actions in times of natural disasters. Local, state, and federal governmental officials did not have an implementation plan to protect the infrastructure as well as a restoration which could be shared across all levels of government and with private organizations to provide the crucial background to make informed decisions of preparedness with limited resources (Leavitt, 2006). Although there were some accomplishments, the ability of the national government to ensure the protection and restoration of critical national infrastructure was stalled by several interrelated problems. Firstly, the response guided by the NRP never accounted for the need to organize essential efforts for the protection and restoration of infrastructure. The critical infrastructure protection and restoration are designated by the NRP as vital goals of the five Emergency Support Functions: Communication, Energy, Transportation, Agriculture, and Public Works and Engineering.

Even though the mentioned vital infrastructures were needed for assistance in the restoration and response efforts, there exist 17 key resource sectors and essential infrastructure that should be synchronized across almost all ESFs in times of response and recovery (Comfort, 2006). The national government failed to synchronize its actions adequately with the efforts of protection and restoration at the local and state levels. As a matter of fact, confusion was created by the federal government when it responded to personalized requests consistently. Also, local, state and federal government officials were responding to Hurricane Katrina without completely understanding the critical infrastructural interdependency in all geographic and the possible nationwide consequences of their actions. For instance, an energy company had generators transported to amenities needed for the restoration of oil flow to the whole of the mid-Atlantic U.S. However, the regional representatives of FEMA decided to divert the generators to healthcare centres. While efforts to save lives are always prioritized, there is a lack of general awareness of the different essential needs (Comfort, 2006). Lastly, the national government did not have the accurate, well-timed, and relevant information that was needed to examine the damaged critical infrastructure. The deployed FEMA teams failed to concentrate on the critical infrastructure and lacked the skills required to examine the needs of protection and restoration.

In your opinion (and please be thoughtful in presenting your case), can federal, state, and local governments truly be prepared for AND work in a coordinated fashion to respond to natural disasters of the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina?

Years after the occurrence of Hurricane Katrina, the national government has decided to fund a number of programs in order to create a nation that is “weather-ready” and a gulf community that is resilient (Col, 2007). Collaborations have been established by the White House with various groups in areas prone to disaster, and new policies have been enacted to tackle the susceptible populations’ needs during natural disasters better. But one cannot be very optimistic about the United States’ preparedness to handle another hurricane as destructive as Katrina. The country would still be quite overwhelmed by such a disaster. However, communities have become more cognizant of ways of addressing susceptible populations in times of disaster (Col, 2007). For example, all hospitals are mandated to have clear plans of how non-ambulatory patients would be moved during emergencies, but the majority of infrastructures that were broken down during Hurricane Katrina remain vulnerable, and this indicates that officials are not willing to accept the real risks of disasters in the future. News reports have indicated that the levees redesigned in New Orleans are stronger than those broken during Katrina, but according to engineers, the levees are not resilient enough to protect against flooding as strong as Katrina.

Real preparedness involves a synchronized outreach and identification of every person in a particular population who might need any form of assistance. It is also essential the people take responsibility for their own security and safety; it means making plans on how they would leave their town in case of an emergency. The administration of President Obama established the

National Preparedness System (NPS) under the Presidential Policy Directive guidance on the 30^th of March 2011 (Kahan, 2014). The National Preparedness System was designed to make sure that the country was able to prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from any natural disaster, just like Hurricane Katrina’s acts of terrorism and any other unexpected disasters. In short, the National Preparedness System and its numerous policies make up the strategic planning and vision of the national government, including inputs from the United States community in relation to preparing the country for any disaster. Finally, The National Preparedness System has established methods meant to achieve the desired preparedness level of the country.

References

Col, J. M. (2007). Managing disasters: The role of local government. Public Administration Review, 67, 114-124.

Comfort, L. K., & Haase, T. W. (2006). Communication, coherence, and collective action: The impact of Hurricane Katrina on communications infrastructure. Public Works management & policy, 10(4), 328-343.

Farazmand, A. (2009). Hurricane Katrina, the crisis of leadership, and chaos management: time for trying the ‘surprise management theory in action.’ Public Organization Review, 9(4), 399.

Garnett, J., & Kouzmin, A. (2009). Crisis communication post-Katrina: what are we learning?. Public Organization Review, 9(4), 385.

Kapucu, N., Arslan, T., & Collins, M. L. (2010). Examining intergovernmental and inter-organizational response to catastrophic disasters: Toward a network-centered approach. Administration & Society, 42(2), 222-247.

Kahan, J. H. (2014). Preparedness Revisited: W (h) either PPD-8?. Homeland Security Affairs, 10(2), 1-48.

Leavitt, W. M., & Kiefer, J. J. (2006). Infrastructure interdependency and the creation of a normal disaster: The case of Hurricane Katrina and the city of New Orleans. Public works management & policy, 10(4), 306-314.

Moynihan, D. P. (2009). The response to Hurricane Katrina. International Risk Governance Council, 1-11.

Nielsen, J. (2012). Inter-group Communication During Hurricane Katrina: How Organizational Culture Defeats Coordination.

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Read Case Study 5 (pages 248-254), “System Failure: The Response to Hurricane Katrina.” In an essay of at least 1,500 words, explain the role of intergovernmental relations between federal, state, and/or local governments in responding to a natural disaster like Hurricane Katrina?

Examining Intergovernmental Relations and Communication Failures in the Response to Hurricane Katrina

Address the following four questions in your essay:

1. What were the primary reasons why intergovernmental relations broke down (some say failed) during the response to Hurricane Katrina?

.What is the significance of communications between different levels of

government and how could communications have been improved during the response to Katrina?

Why have all levels of government in the U.S. been slow to invest in maintaining infrastructure and did lack of infrastructure investment play a role in the Katrina disaster?

  In your opinion (and please be thoughtful in presenting your case), can federal, state, and/or local governments truly be prepared for AND work in a coordinated fashion to respond to natural disasters of the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina?